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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF GARY HORLICK
AND SARAH RICHARDSON
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: Gary, I have a question on Fast
Track. Do you think that the environmental provisions in the NAFTA, or any
future trade agreements, will be strengthened? Do you think that will make a
difference in getting Fast Track through? Is the support of the environmental
people critical, and if so, what changes would you have to make to push it
over?
ANSWER, MR. HORLICK: If I had to guess, there were negotiations for
three years within the Congress about what environmental and labor provi-
sions should be put in Fast Track. So, in some sort of public choice sense,
you have to assume that the bargain was closely struck, so that anything you
did to strengthen the environmental provisions might get you votes on one
side, but would lose you votes on the other side. This was rather fully bar-
gained out. So, I would not think that there is anything you can do that actu-
ally increases your number of votes. It is going to be a trade-off. Probably,
the best prospect for Fast Track, maybe not for other things, would be if the
Republicans won a very large majority this fall and thus would not need
Democratic votes. Otherwise, I do not expect anything until the year 2001.
QUESTION, MR. BENT: We have seen the roles of NGOs and environ-
mental negotiations and the public faith surrounding environmental issues,
and I would be interested in your view as to the changing roles of NGOs in
the environmental debate, and also whether you see that affecting the way
NGOs organize themselves in other international negotiations, particularly
trade and investment.
ANSWER, MR. HORLICK: We should probably share the answer. Busi-
ness is an NGO also. So, what you are seeing is a perfection of special inter-
est lobbying all over the world, and it is overrunning governments.
My personal view is that governments are ceding their proper role to un-
democratic elected bodies, which includes not only environmental NGOs, but
also business. Clearly, they have. And so we have invented this term "civil
society," but no one elected any of these people.
I look at it perhaps in a rather old-fashioned way. But it is happening.
What you then worry about is the democratic legitimacy of the United States
and Canada telling Mexicans that they should have a coral reef rather than
jobs. I am not knocking coral reefs. But who has a right to tell the Mexicans
what to do? And, you will note, the constant thread through this is the richer
countries telling either poorer countries or poorer sectors in other rich coun-
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tries that they lose. That is not a pretty picture. I can assure you that is how
the rest of the world looks at it is as we talk about the environment, but this is
a reflection of hegemony.
ANSWER, MS. RICHARDSON: I think the environmental NGOs are
becoming very sophisticated, but predominately only in the United States.
When you compare the United States and Europe, there still is not much of
an environmental voice. I think we are seeing this now in the Summit of the
Americas and in the FTAA. NAFTA is distinguishable for a couple of rea-
sons. One, the United States so wholly dominates the North American region
that the U.S. NGOs have a disproportionate voice in the debate. As you move
south and you try now to incorporate Central America and South America
with big countries like Brazil, you will find that the U.S. NGOs have less and
less influence, although certainly not less interest. They are all still there, and
they all go to the meetings.
They are mostly the same NGOs that participated in the NAFTA debate,
but a few have dropped out. A few cannot maintain the pace anymore. They
are just not interested. They feel like they have been talking about the same
issues for five years and nothing has been done. They are cynical and they
are quitting. They are working on other issues, but the big ones are still there.
I think that, outside the OECD and NAFTA, they are going to continue to
be frustrated for a long time because they are not going to get the same kind
of airplay they got here four years ago.
COMMENT, MR. HORLICK: If I could just add one thing. At least
some people will continue to be interested, particularly in the WTO, where I
am an NGO. I get invited to their trade environment symposium as an NGO,
which is sort of odd, but they have to treat everyone the same. They will
maintain an interest to the extent that the WTO dispute resolution system
works and it is working well.
So, I agree with what Sarah was saying. Trade sanctions are about look-
ing for a big stick. Most of the environmental fights are not directly a result
of trade. It is, to the extent that trade causes economic growth, a result of that
economic growth. But the backup at the border is not caused by trade. It is
caused by customs bureaucracies. There is no backup at the French/Dutch
border because there is no one there. Most of the environmental effects advo-
cates are trying to use trade sanctions that have nothing to do with trade.
They are just using the most effective instrument they can find.
As the WTO becomes an effective instrument, NGOs will want to use
trade. They will be continually frustrated because, if you go to an organiza-
tion whose mission it is to increase trade and ask them to use a sanction
which decreases trade, you will not get very far. So, I do not predict a very
happy relationship for the next five years or so.
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QUESTION, MR. TUTTLE: Some of what I have heard is encouraging
and some is not, in terms of my question. I come from a generation of trade
negotiators, trade lawyers who used to have GATT-zilla up on their doors.
There was a political cartoon of GATT-zilla destroying the environment put
out by the environmentalists leading up to the end of the Uruguay Round.
At the same time, I guess there were the two solitudes between the people
fighting for the environmental issues and the people fighting for trade issues.
To what extent, since the Uruguay Round, and since the progress in NAFTA,
have we been able to bridge that gap? And, actually, as Canadian lawyers
and American lawyers, what sort of obligation should there be for us to help
as engineers to bridge what I still think is a gap between those who see them-
selves on the environmental side and those who see themselves on the trade
side?
ANSWER, MS. RICHARDSON: Let me take a crack at that, just from
some of the experiences we have had at the Commission. One of the things
we are doing this year that we have not done before is to create a working
group of trade and environment officials. We are doing this, in part because,
after two years of working on the trade environment program at the Commis-
sion, all of a sudden trade officials started coming to our meetings, and they
started realizing that we were working on projects where we were discussing
trade issues. They wanted to be involved in those discussions.
This sort of informal involvement is now formalizing itself in this group.
One of the mandates of this group is going to be to find areas of common
interest to work on among these officials. Now, it has not been particularly
easy, and I do not expect it to be particularly easy, to find these areas of
common interest.
But, one thing that we do find now is that the trade and environment offi-
cials are actually talking to each other, not just within the national govern-
ments. Say, for example, in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, you have
officials from the environmental departments calling up their trade counter-
parts saying, look, this what is we are doing, what do you think? Just begin-
ning that dialogue at the governmental level is something that is new to a lot
of these people, particularly in environmental departments.
In Mexico, this divide was much more pronounced and much more seri-
ous than it was in Canada or the United States. Then, what you have are two
representatives from each government coming to the table, so you have six
representatives. You have the three national governments with the three rep-
resentatives from each of the two sides. And that debate is completely differ-
ent as well.
We have a long way to go before we find the consensus that we need to
find on issues that will move this debate forward. But actually, despite the
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frustration involved in getting these dialogs going, I think that communica-
tion is incredibly useful. That is just from a governmental perspective.
ANSWER, MR. HORLICK: One way you can bridge the gap is to utilize
a number of trade rules which would have beneficial environmental impacts
if enforced. One obvious area where there is considerable discussion in the
WTO now is on subsidies in areas like fishing, agriculture, and coal, which is
usually considered the most polluting of the conventional fuels. It is also the
most subsidized. The problem lies in getting any WTO member government
to make a complaint against any other WTO member government. But, there
is a reason why there are no fish off Canada. They are paying huge amounts
of money to buy the best technology in the pond to catch all the fish. This is
documented, the amount of subsidies for fishing. It is the same with agricul-
ture in Europe, the overuse of agricultural chemicals is part of the common
agricultural policy. So, there is some thinking about how you can use trade
rules in environmentally beneficial ways.
The other comment regards my observation of NGOs in the United
States. You asked if that gap would be bridged. I am on the advisory board of
an environmental NGO. What I see is that you will never satisfy some of the
NGOs because all they are interested in is using trade for leverage. They are
not particularly interested in the fact that trade increases wealth. Some of
them, to be blunt, think wealth is bad, especially for poor people. I found this
hard to explain in an international forum. But other NGOs have tried to learn
how the trade system works, and you are seeing some of the results. They are
working with it in productive ways. I think there is room for movement there.
Basically, though, if people are just looking for trade to use as a stick, they
are going to be disappointed.
COMMENT, MR. DUDLEY: When I looked at the CEC website a cou-
ple weeks ago,I I noticed that, of the twelve or thirteen complaints which you
have got sitting on there right now, six of them were from Canadian NGOs
which were basically using the whole process to take a political bash at the
Canadian government. It is an observation, maybe a question.
COMMENT, MS. RICHARDSON: We cannot actually stop people from
submitting petitions to the commission. When we have a properly filed sub-
mission, we deal with it. If the way we deal with it is by saying, sorry, we are
not going to deal with it any further, then it still goes on the website, stating
same.
I guess, in a sense, that is one of the good things. The bad thing about this
open agreement is that it gives people that kick. Sometimes it is a political
kick, and sometimes it will mean something. I think the point I would add to
I See <http://www.cec.org> (last visited Oct. 1, 1998).
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what Gary just said is that all of this is so political so often that you end up
looking for that common ground and looking for the right petition. You have
got to expect that NGOs will support trade in some instances, and they may
not support trade in other instances. It all depends on what else they care
about at the time.
QUESTION, MR. DUDLEY: Should it not be a mechanism for the
frivolous and vexatious?
ANSWER, MS. RICHARDSON: Well, we could put next to it a mecha-
nism for the frivolous and vexatious, but it would still be there. Right?
QUESTION, MS. DALLMEYER: Yes, I have a question. I guess I will
direct it more toward Gary. I was trained first as a scientist and then as a
lawyer. So, it amuses me to hear the trade lawyers talk about how the envi-
ronmental NGOs are finally learning something about trade law, and that fact
may be improving their ability to talk with you. I was wondering to what
extent you would evaluate the ability of trade lawyers to absorb issues of
ecosystem concepts, population biology, and things of that sort which may
have a direct effect on how you set up trade regulations?
ANSWER, MR. HORLICK: Very low. That is why we are trade lawyers.
We cannot do numbers. You will be encouraged to know that, at least within
USTR, for example, the environmental shop is basically run from the EPA.
The EPA sends all their people over. So, certainly, there is progress on that
front. But, more to the point, you actually raised an issue which I consider
quite interesting and useful, which would be for trade negotiators to have a
better sense of the environmental consequences of the things they are negoti-
ating. The problem is that the negotiations start sounding like environmental
impact statements and everyone runs the other way for fear it would mean
just litigation rather than negotiation.
To give you a good example, the mess along the U.S./Mexico border was
not a result of free trade, but of Murphy's Law. When the maquiladora sys-
tem was set up, Mexico required that the plants be near the border. So, you
had all the plants dumped in the same spot with no infrastructure. One hopes,
though one cannot guarantee, that if the negotiators had been aware in ad-
vance that these rules they were setting up would have caused an environ-
mental disaster, they would have thought them through.
So, you cannot count on the trade lawyers or trade negotiators to antici-
pate these effects, and Murphy's Law is the one constant with which they
must deal. So what is needed is a system that generates that information
without it being used as a road block for the actual negotiations. And it is not
going to come. I do not have an answer for how to do that. But you raise a
good point of what is missing.
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.QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: Gary, you said in the case of the sea
turtles and in the Tuna-Dolphin case, the WTO found that we could not use
trade to accomplish environmental objectives. Would another solution be to
try to talk trading partners into changing their environmental laws so you
would not get that type of conflict? In other words, is that trying to persuade
them to accomplish environmental objectives through environmental legisla-
tion, rather than destroying trade relationships?
ANSWER, MR. HORLICK: I think that would be ideal because you
would actually get instruments better suited to the purpose you seek, and you
would have people negotiating when they knew what they were talking
about. Certainly, I think a lot of people will remember, the first real burst of
international environmental law was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The
perception was that it did not have teeth, so people did not do anything with
it. There has been a constant search for teeth ever since. One form of teeth is
trade sanctions, the other is negative publicity, as Sarah explained. One of the
things you definitely hear from the environmental groups is the lack of what
they call a GEO, a global environment organization. So they wind up dealing
with the WTO by default, and as I mentioned, they will always be'frustrated.
Now, of course, a lot of people do not want them to have a GEO either,
for fear it would be too effective. I was just at the WTO's Trade and Envi-
ronment Symposium, and there was one at IUCN (the World Conservation
Union) the day before. .The IUCN proposed an informal global environ-
mental forum, because there is nothing like it anywhere. But, on the flip side,
things like CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species) have worked, not perfectly, but if you look at it, the glass is more
full than empty. The Montreal Protocol has worked. So my personal view is
that environmental groups have been, to some extent, dedicating a dispro-
portionate amount of their resources to this very exciting trade and environ-
ment fight when they ought to be going after pure environmental agreements
like the Kyoto Agreement. I am not saying Kyoto is good or bad, but, it goes
straight for the solution rather than pushing for trade sanctions, which will
always get you into a fight with other people. Again, they could legitimately
claim that they tried it the direct way and it did not work.
COMMENT, MS. RICHARDSON: There are a lot of environmental
groups that will tell you that the only way they can get people's attention is
when they attach an environmental issue to a trade issue because, without
that, the environment tends to be marginalized in setting priorities.
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